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Introduction
Although we frequently encounter the concept of the 
secular,1 there is no general consensus on its meaning.2 
Much like the concept of religion, the secular knows a 
huge variety of interpretations, strongly dependent on 
historical and cultural contexts (see e.g. Asad 2011). Dur-
ing a congress I attended in Turin last year, one scholar 
described the secular as the complete opposite of religion, 
as “the Other of religion”. A later speaker, though, disa-
greed, and preferred considering religion and the secu-
lar as sisters: related phenomena that were overlapping 
regularly. Though the notion of the secular was referred to 
many times during that congress, we, except for the two 
times I just referred to, never discussed what we actually 
meant by it. This is just one example out of the many that 
I have come across since I started exploring the secular 
a few years ago. Despite its frequent usage, the term has 
many interpretations, interpretations which are usually 
not put on the table as it is implicitly suggested to be part 
of a certain basic knowledge.
All of this, however, does not alter the fact that the 
secular – whatever it is – is a crucial part of contempo-
rary Western societies. In his monumental book A secular 
age, Charles Taylor (2007) describes the transformation 
of the Western religious climate through which the West 
has moved from a climate in which it is almost impossible 
not to believe in God, to our current situation in which 
believing in God simply is one option out of many. In 
this ‘secular age’, Taylor argues, believers and unbelievers 
participate in a spiritual search within the context of an 
immanent frame: a worldview that distinguishes a self-
sufficient immanent natural order from the transcendent.
The West has abandoned the path it has walked for 
centuries. Currently, religion is an option, not a given. 
Moreover, the fact that religion has lost its default posi-
tion in society implies that this particular position has 
‘opened up’ for other ambitious candidates that seek to 
‘reign’ our Western culture. And indeed, as Taylor writes, 
a set of ‘unbelieving construals’ (irreligious notions of the 
world) seems to have been successful in claiming that par-
ticular position: 
The presumption of unbelief has become dominant 
in more and more Western milieux; and has achieved 
hegemony in certain crucial ones, in the academic 
and intellectual life, for instance; whence it can 
more easily extend itself to others. (Taylor 2007: 13).
The secular, which happily accommodates this default 
option,3 currently is the air that we all breathe, or, as 
Hirschkind (2011: 634) puts it, the water that we all swim in.
As a scholar studying religion, I am both puzzled and 
intrigued by this dominance of the secular. In my view, our 
secular age features some interesting paradoxes, which 
hint at some of the complex power dynamics at stake. Is it, 
for example, not strange that I am currently working in a 
department devoted to the study of religion, whereas such 
departments focused at studying the secular as a phenom-
enon do not exist? Or, how can we explain that we are 
familiar with all kinds of ethnographies that investigate 
all kinds of religions all over the world, while an ethnog-
raphy of the secular, regardless of its geographical con-
text, is surprisingly rare? In short: why has the dominant 
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There is a Sexular Body: Introducing a Material Approach 
to the Secular
Jelle Wiering
This article calls for more ‘bottom-up inquiry’ into the secular, departing from the assumption that it 
features normative ideologies and practices that dominate current societies.  I plea for collecting and ana-
lyzing manifestations of the secular, as the secular as an phenomenon in society is surprisingly unexplored. 
To stimulate such inquiry, I suggest a material approach to the secular, as it will provide researchers with 
tools to conduct empirical research on the secular in contemporary societies. Inspired by Joan Scott, 
Charles Hirschkind, and Talal Asad, this article explores the notion of a Dutch ‘sexular’ body: a body which 
affective-gestural repertoires, limited here to the context of sexuality, people in society (historically) 
associate with the secular. I conclude by arguing that a material approach to the secular will contribute 
to (1) obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the secular, including its cultural conceptualiza-
tions and manifestations, and (2) clarifying, and hence facing the normativity the secular imposes on the 
people living in secular societies.
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secular, despite its unclearness, escaped so much of the 
academic scrutiny that religion has had to face, and is still 
facing?
This essay is structured around two major questions: 1) 
Why, despite several authors’ plea for more empirical stud-
ies into the secular, has the contemporary secular largely 
escaped empirical scrutiny? and 2) What steps do we need 
to take to illuminate this particular blind spot? I propose 
a material approach to the secular; an approach that pro-
vides researchers with tools to conduct empirical research 
on the secular in our contemporary secular age. Then, I 
illustrate the fruitfulness of such a material approach to 
the secular by exploring the notion of a Dutch ‘sexular’ 
body: a body which affective-gestural repertoires (see 
Hirschkind 2011), limited in this essay to the context of 
sexuality, people in society (historically) associate with the 
secular. I conclude by arguing that a material approach to 
the secular will contribute to (1) obtaining a more com-
prehensive understanding of the secular, and (2) clarify-
ing, and hence, facing the normativity the secular climate 
imposes on the people living in it.
Cultural secularism
Quite in contrast to the notion of the secular, the concept 
of secularism has received a lot of academic attention 
over the years, which explains why I start my theoretical 
exploration of the secular there.4 Secularism for a long 
time appeared to have no ideological significance of its 
own (e.g. Calhoun et al. 2011). The term ‘secularism’ itself 
has its origin in mid-nineteenth century England, where 
George Holyoake coined the term to name an orientation 
to life designed to attract both theists and atheists (Cady & 
Hurd 2010: 3). Holyoake understood secularism as some-
thing coordinating a variety of religions and philosophies 
but not as an oppositional alternative to religion (idem).
In contemporary Western societies, though, secularism 
is often understood as a necessary defensive mechanism 
that protects citizens from potential manifestations of 
religion that neglect the private sphere they have been 
confined to. In the Netherlands, for example, many Dutch 
state that they feel protected by the secular government, 
which is assumed to maintain a strict separation of church 
and state (see Tamimi Arab, 2015: 140).
In academia, secularism and its features have become 
subject to intensified academic scrutiny – mainly from 
philosophical or theological-political perspectives –, 
which has undermined its alleged ‘value freedom’ and 
‘objectivity’ (e.g. Calhoun 2011: 4). Secularism is now 
increasingly perceived as something not neutral in itself; 
it is in fact something, which is in need of investigation. 
Hence, in academia, the aim of ‘rethinking secularism’ has 
been taken up by many (e.g. Calhoun et al 2011; Cady & 
Hurd 2010; Bangstad 2009), and others have gone even 
further and have suggested replacing the term with multi-
ple, more-accurate alternatives (Bader 2012).
However, as is also noted by Tamimi Arab (2015: 32), 
this academic attention so far mainly has concerned politi-
cal secularism, that is, those forms of secularism that man-
ifold ways that the state governs and regulates religions 
(idem; see also Asad 2003; Casanova 2009; Wohlrab-Sahr 
& Burchardt 2012). Or, if the respective studies were con-
ducted empirically, they mainly focused on how these 
models have been put to practice in different societies 
over the world. Additionally, such studies on secularism 
have a tendency to focus on secularism in the context of 
one religion in particular, namely Islam.5 Cultural forms of 
secularism (Tamimi Arab 2015: 162) have not been inves-
tigated so thorougly, which can probably be explained by 
the fact that a lot of the academic interest on secularism 
comes from philosophical or theologico-political angles 
(see also Dressler, M., & Mandair, A. 2011: 21). 
Cultural secularism, as I understand it, is a notion that 
is not per se connected to the state, but rather refers to 
the interpretations of secularism as we can find them 
in society.6 It covers what Taylor describes as a set of 
‘unbelieving construals’; sets of views in society that are 
largely based on the assumption that they are indispen-
sable to overcome the “irrationality” of religion (Taylor 
2007: 269). 
It is important to question what this notion of cul-
tural secularism exactly contributes to our understand-
ing of the secularism, given that both Taylor and Asad 
both already emphasized that secularism is not limited to 
political contexts but that it rather is deeply embedded in 
Western culture. The point I see in using the notions of 
political and cultural secularism is that it clarifies that we 
are dealing with two different phenomena, which are of 
course strongly related but which nevertheless also need 
separate inquiries to understand them better.7
For instance, when anthropologist Orit Avishai (2008) 
describes the presumed ideology of ‘the secular Other’ that 
her Jewish interlocutors perceive themselves to be deal-
ing with, she means something very different than Asad’s 
description of secularism as a political ideology that is 
part and parcel of contemporary liberal  democracies. The 
secular Other Avishai writes about, for instance recom-
mends “shaky edifices” of marriage (2008: 420), including 
sexuality driven by passion and hedonist desires (Avishai 
2007) and it is seen as religion’s primary Other. This, of 
course, differs from a state’s political doctrine regarding 
religion, though it may be related. Hence, a clarification 
concerning what form of secularism we are writing about 
seems helpful to avoid unspoken confusions such as the 
one I described in the introduction.
Because cultural secularism has largely escaped the aca-
demic attention political secularism has been subject to, 
a somewhat narrow understanding of secularism domi-
nates the academic understandings of the concept. I con-
sider this problematic as cultural secularism does play an 
important role in society (see e.g. Bartelink 2016; Wiering 
2016; Tamimi Arab 2015; Nijhawan 2011; Verkaaik 2009; 
Jansen 2006), and, hence, ignoring this role contributes 
to what Dressler & Mandair – probably somewhat too 
excessive – call a prolongation of “the impasse between 
theory and empiricism that continues to be a hallmark of 
many books with a focus on the politics of religion and 
 secularism” (Dressler & Mandair 2011: 21). It seems rel-
evant to me to explore and concretize what secularism 
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consists of in the different facets of society,  but also, 
supplementary, to investigate how people in society 
experience and conceive secularity (see Wohlrab-Sahr & 
Burchardt 2012: 884). To do so, though, we first need to 
‘concretize’ the secular; operationalizing it into something 
that we can actually explore in society.
A secular body
One scholar who took up such an aim of concretizing the 
secular, is the anthropologist Charles Hirschkind (2011). 
In his article ‘is there a secular body’, Hirschkind examines 
whether it is possible to determine a “particular configu-
ration of the human sensorium – of sensibilities, affects, 
embodied dispositions – specific to secular subjects, and 
thus constitutive of what we mean by ‘secular society’” 
(Hirschkind 2011: 633). Hirschkind considers the secular 
a concept that “articulates a constellation of institutions, 
ideas, and affective orientations” (idem). 
Following Asad, Hirschkind explains that when one is 
seeking to make sense of the secular, which is obviously 
required when one attempts to find a secular body, it is 
important to realize the secular is inevitably related to the 
religious, and, therefore, it might be best pursued through 
its shadow (religion) (Hirschkind 2011: 633–634, see also 
Asad 2003: 16). The secular’s religious shadow seems 
easier to determine – religion can more easily be found 
– and, hence, approaching the secular indirectly through 
its shadow might be a useful strategy for enabling an 
exploration.
The difficulty with the question of a secular body, is that 
it is blindingly direct, which, obstructs the mentioned 
strategy of exploring it via its religious shadow. In other 
words: the question challenges us to focus directly at the 
secular, which in fact also makes Hirschkind’s question 
so innovative. It does not focus on exploring and reveal-
ing particular secular norms that instruct, discipline, and 
confine religious bodies in current secular societies (e.g. 
Göle 2010; Fadil 2011; Selby 2014; Fernando 2014; Amir-
Moazami 2016) but instead directly looks at the secular 
body itself.
To illustrate the difficulties one encounters when try-
ing to answer the question, Hirschkind draws on three 
examples, which are taken from Why I am not a secular-
ist (Connolly 1999) and Formations of the Secular (Asad 
2003). The first example analyzed is Kant’s (1978) analysis 
of the particular set of guidelines for the dinner host to 
follow to conform to civilized expectations. The second 
example discusses Asad’s (2003) analysis of the develop-
ment of the secular tradition of Romantic poetry, and the 
third example features Asad’s (2003) famous inquiry into 
the secularization of pain (Hirschkind 2011: 636–640). 
Analyzing the practices in these examples, Hirschkind 
suggests that it seems unjustified to equate such practices 
with the secular because doing so would result in losing a 
grasp of what is so unique to the secular. We would “lose 
an understanding of the way the practice of distinguish-
ing religious from secular gives impetus to the set of shifts 
that constitute the secular – and hence we lose a sense 
of precisely what is secular” (Hirschkind 2011: 640). By 
attributing a set of embodied dispositions to the secular, 
Hirschkind argues, the secular’s fundamental principle of 
being related to religion is violated. 
Hirschkind concludes by arguing that secularism appears 
to entail a continual skepticism toward itself. It claims to 
be a theological overcoming of the religious but it cannot 
really provide an alternative, as its positive attempt to pos-
tulate an ethical and epistemological foundation remains 
dependent on a negative gesture that promises to over-
come the religious (Hirschkind 2011: 644).
This interesting instability is at the heart of Hirschkind’s 
understanding of the secular, and, to me, it seems that 
it basically complicates any attempt of finding a secular 
body: when seeking to pinpoint a secular body, we come 
up with particular images of such bodies only to find out 
that these images do not meet the ultimate criterion of 
the secular, which is ‘having a religious shadow’.
Talal Asad (2011), intrigued by Hirschkind’s discussion, 
also engaged in this discussion of a secular body by looking 
at it through the lens of pain. In his article ‘Thinking about 
the secular body, pain, and liberal politics’, Asad examines 
several grammars of pain to subsequently analyze what 
they could tell us about a secular body.8 Asad reflects on 
many interesting examples to eventually conclude that 
the existence of a secular body primarily depends on the 
particular definition of the secular embraced.
For example, Asad asks whether we could think of 
a secular body as a body that is manifesting particular 
notions of pain that are also advocated by modern secu-
lar societies. When Asad subsequently attempts to apply 
this understanding in conceptualizing a secular body, 
he sketches this secular body as a body that is pulling in 
opposing directions, reflecting the contradictions that 
are, according to Asad, deeply embedded in such modern 
societies. On the one hand there is what Asad (2011: 671) 
calls a democratic ethos (an articulation and acceptance 
of pain as a condition of life), and hence, compassion and 
sensibility, and on the other hand, there is a wish for pun-
ishment (a particular joy in the infliction of punishment 
on others in society).
However, as Asad, in my view rightly, concludes, this 
interpretation of the secular as the collection of notions 
advocated by modern secular societies is only one inter-
pretation: the assumption that the secular equals a mod-
ern secular society’s view is, of course, debatable. Taking 
this into account, we could argue that there is no essential 
secular body: there are only particular rules that tell us 
when a usage of the term ‘the secular’ can be regarded 
as correct or incorrect, and Asad suggests that we explore 
who comes up with these rules (Asad 2011: 673).
In my opinion, both Hirschkind and Asad examine the 
secular body in their own interesting but nevertheless 
different way. Hirschkind starts his inquiry with a care-
fully chosen definition, proceeds by presenting three 
examples, and concludes by discussing why the examples 
did not really meet the demands of the definition. Asad, 
however, sets out to discuss many potential examples of a 
secular body, then literally questions whether the bodies 
discussed in the examples are secular, only to conclude 
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that the matter seems to be dependent on the specific def-
inition embraced. The former remains loyal to a particular 
definition and, by doing so, hints at the impossibility of 
a secular body, whereas the latter attempts to show that 
analyzing a lot of examples does not lead to a definition 
that covers all.
It is at this point that I would like to enter this discus-
sion through shedding some Asadian light on Hirschkind’s 
attempt. When we take into account that the existence of 
a secular body strongly depends on the particular defini-
tion of the secular embraced, it seems interesting to me to 
temporarily neglect academic conceptualizations, and to 
explore interpretations of the secular in society instead. A 
secular body as it is perceived in a lived society might be 
considered ‘incorrect’ from an academic, theoretical per-
spective but it might nevertheless be actually existing and, 
therefore, worthy of investigation.
My point is that the academic discussions about the 
potential existence of a secular body should note that 
these bodies might, in fact, already be subject of organi-
zation’s policies, the talks parents and their children are 
having about hygiene, the sex educations at schools (see 
Rasmussen 2010; Schrijvers & Wiering in progress), or 
the post-match conversations football players are hav-
ing in the shower. Through an empirical exploration – by 
which I mean, following Dressler and Mandaire (2011: 
21), descriptive-analytical modes of inquiry, often from 
a historical, sociological, or anthropological perspective 
– of the secular in society, we might be able to explore 
how the gap, which gradually emerged as a consequence 
of the broken secular promises suggested by Hirschkind, 
is bridged. In other words: I suggest an empirical inquiry 
into the secular that seeks to explore what ideas and 
practices have filled up ‘the emptiness’ that has gradually 
emerged as a consequence of secularity replacing religion 
as the default option.
To do so is not easy, though. In contrast to the litera-
ture stressing a need for empirical inquiry into the secular 
(e.g. Verkaaik & Spronk 2011; Cannell 2010; Wohlrab-
Sahr & Burchardt 2012; Cady & Hurd 2010), relatively few 
scholars have actually focused on the conceptualizations 
and manifestations of the secular in society, as empirical 
research on the secularity rather focuses on how particu-
lar state models regarding religion actually play out in dif-
ferent countries. Obviously, such a focus is important, but 
I also consider it important to explore how the secular is 
conceptualized and manifested in other facets of society. 
What do people and organizations in society, both implic-
itly and explicitly, understand to be covered by the notion 
of the secular? What are the practices advocated by the 
people who have embraced the default option? To explore 
such questions, I argue that a material approach is helpful, 
which, when employed in empirical research, provides us 
with certain stepping stones for approaching the secular.
A material approach to the secular 
In the face of recent debates around the presence of reli-
gion, long existing taken-for-granted understandings of 
religion have been subject to substantial critique (e.g. 
Asad 2003). One of these critiques I would like to set forth 
here is headed by anthropologist Birgit Meyer (2006, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014). Building on William Pietz’ work on the 
fetish (1985, 1987), Meyer pleads for a critical rethink-
ing of the relation between religion and materiality (e.g. 
Meyer 2014: 206). In a nutshell, Meyer (2014: 215) consid-
ers religion something that is ‘being done’, or something 
that ‘happens’ in society. Religion is “a particular, author-
ized, and transmitted set of practices and ideas aimed at 
‘going beyond the ordinary’, ‘surpassing’ or ‘transcending’ 
a limit, or gesturing toward ‘the rest of what is’” (see Van 
de Port 2010).
Building on Bruno Latour’s (2010) plea for ‘symmetrical 
anthropology’, Meyer argues that religion, much like any 
sphere of life, is fabricated by a mobilization of “texts, sounds, 
pictures and objects and by engaging in  practices of speak-
ing, singing, being possessed, and so on […]” (Meyer 2014: 
214). Rather than prolonging a ‘mentalistic understanding’ 
(2014: 213) of religion as something that primarily takes 
place in the mind, which, according to Meyer is an important 
part of the protestant legacy in the study of religion, Meyer 
suggests to take sets of practices, material  cultures, and fab-
rics of lived, embodied experience seriously.
Intrigued by Meyer’s ‘protest’ against confirming to 
hegemonic (academic) conceptions of what religion is 
supposed to look like, I suggest that it is likewise interest-
ing to apply this material approach to the secular. I do 
not use the term ‘materiality’ here as it has been used in 
the wake of the framework of the so-called ‘material turn’, 
in which, objects are playfully suggested to have particu-
lar forms of power or even agency. I simply understand 
materiality as the “the stuff and practices of sensual living 
together, interpreted and crystallized through concepts 
that could just as easily obfuscate power relations […] as 
help us to see them” (Belting et al. 2014). I understand 
the secular here as we explore people living in secular-
ized countries to perceive it (see e.g. Van der Veer 2006; 
Verkaaik 2009; Tamimi Arab 2015; Schuh, Burchardt, & 
Wohlrab-Sahr 2012; Verkaaik & Tamimi Arab 2016).
To empirically approach the secular, I first suggest to 
develop a provisional typology, based on views about the 
secular that are empirically gathered, which will help us 
to roughly categorize several secular positions. In order to 
do so, we, like Asad and Hirschkind, need to depart from 
a particular definition of the secular, because I deem it 
 problematic to gather such findings without a conceptual 
definition. This might appear as an imposition of theory but 
I consider that an inevitable evil. Every researcher enters 
the field with baggage, and this becomes particularly clear 
when we, later, have to legitimize our selection of that what 
we consider to be secular or not. We could, of course, at 
first, try stick to our interlocutors’ interpretations of the sec-
ular, but I do not consider this fruitful as I have noted that, 
at least in the Netherlands the term in itself is  frequently 
unknown (see Schrijvers & Wiering in progress).
So, when we, for example, embrace Hirschkind’s defini-
tion of the secular as something that is bounded to its reli-
gious shadow, we could conceptualize a typology of the 
secular based on collected expressions, manifestations, 
or views regarding religion.9 Obviously, but importantly, 
such expressions, manifestations, or views do not need to 
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correspond with the definition we initially opted for: it 
could well be that we find people interpreting the secular 
as something religious, something entangled with notions 
of race, something related to gender, something related to 
agency, something related to food, and so on. Our concep-
tual definition merely serves as a starting point.
It is in this process of developing a typology of the 
secular that a material approach is useful. The point is 
that conducting empirical research that takes materiality 
serious will enable us to explore how the secular is (per-
haps implicitly) manifested in day-to-day life, because the 
approach stimulates exploring material forms that people 
in society are – perhaps without realizing it – associating 
with what they – perhaps also without realizing – con-
sider secular. Once we have explored such material forms, 
the different interpretations of these forms can be gath-
ered and analyzed in order to add new categories to our 
typology or to critical reflect on the categories we already 
had conceptualized on the basis of other empirical find-
ings. So, a material approach to the secular not only seeks 
and analyzes material manifestations of what is (implic-
itly) considered secular, it also provides us with tools for 
reflecting on the categories we already conceptualized on 
the basis of emic ideologies.
With material forms of the secular, I mean places some 
consider secular (Gökariksel 2009); particular styles of 
dressing, regardless of what the people dressing this way 
think themselves (Fadil 2011; Selby 2014); objects, such as 
condoms, associated with secular health-care organizations 
(Bartelink 2016); medicines, assumed to be part of secular, 
rational society (Hirschkind 2011); food some associate 
with being secular, e.g. Chelsea Woppers (“chocolate-like, 
fudge-like strips of goodness”) (Engelke 2015a: 77); par-
ticular authorized forms of behavior, including a secular 
dealing with the coffin (Engelke 2015b) or, as I will argue 
later, specific practices of sex (see also Engelke 2015a).
Let me first, however, make some crucial implicit mat-
ters explicit. First, comparable to Meyer’s plea for a mate-
rial approach to religion, the suggested material approach 
to the secular – which I propose here in the context of 
empirical research, but which is probably also relevant 
in different branches of research – implicitly critiques 
hegemonic theoretical conceptions of what a particular 
phenomenon, in this case, the secular, is supposed to look 
like. By introducing a material approach to the secular, I 
criticize the ongoing tendency of approaching the secular 
pre-eminently from theoretical, or politically-orientated 
perspectives. Perspectives, which, as has been argued by 
Dressler & Mandair (2011: 21), sometimes tend to rather 
be the product of normative trains of thoughts than the 
result of empirical investigations.
By including different perspectives of the secular, 
this approach seeks to obtain a less ‘deconstructed’ and 
‘denaturalized’ understanding of these phenomena, and, 
instead, aims to grasp them from a bottom-up perspec-
tive (see Žižek 2008; Cady & Hurd 2010; Cannell 2010; 
Verkaaik & Spronk 2011).
Second, and I consider this of major importance, a mate-
rial approach to the secular urges us to face that certain 
objects, acts, bodies or other forms frequently considered 
neutral or value free, are definitely not experienced as 
such by others (see also Mahmood 2009). As long as we 
do not sufficiently investigate how the secular is under-
stood and ‘done’ in society, some taken-for-granted mate-
rial forms might be harmful for some, not necessarily 
religious, people in society (see Butler 2008).
It is now time to illustrate the approach’s relevance 
through applying it to the discussion of a secular body. 
Like Asad focuses on the body in the context of pain, I will 
examine the issue through a particular lens: the practice 
of sex. I selected sex because it is, and I am obviously fol-
lowing Foucault here, one of the main conduits of power, 
and an important crossroad of the social and the private 
(e.g. Spronk 2014; Weeks 2013; see also Hurd, 2011: 173). 
A word of caution is appropriate here: the upcoming 
analysis is obviously simplistic in the sense that I have not 
been able here to take into account all relevant aspects 
including gender, race, power, and class. This essay, unfor-
tunately, is only capable of showing the tip of the iceberg 
and, therefore, much more research is needed. Again, I 
consider this article an encouragement – ‘a little nudge 
out of the door’– for more extensive scrutiny. 
Sexuality in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, cultural secularism, or in Verkaaik’s 
(2009: 93) words ‘progressive nationalism’ plays an impor-
tant role in many facets of Dutch culture, including the 
public sphere, media, and education.10 Both left-wing and 
right-wing political parties consider themselves ‘defend-
ers of secularity’, and explicitly attempt to distance them-
selves from what they consider religion, namely ‘dogmatic’, 
non-individualistic, non-emancipatory, and non-tolerant 
(Verkaaik, 2009: 115). The hegemonic conviction is that 
secularity and secularism, in all their different interpreta-
tions, are a fundamental aspect of Dutch liberal society, 
which has made its way into our society in the 1960s (see 
also Mepschen et al 2010).
Interestingly, this ‘cherished’ secularity appears to 
have a particular entanglement with  sexuality.11 Joan 
Scott (2009) coined the interesting notion of ‘sexular-
ism’ to denote a particular form of embodiment that 
is part and parcel of secularism (see also Verkaaik & 
Spronk 2011: 85). Over the past years, interesting find-
ings on the Dutch ‘sexular’ discourse have appeared (e.g. 
Butler 2008; Mepschen et al 2010; Verkaaik & Spronk 
2011; Schuh et al 2012).12 The Dutch,  allegedly liberal 
(that is, supposedly unrestricted), views on  sexuality, 
often assumed to derive from the ‘sexual revolution’ in 
the 1960s, are considered to be under threat as a con-
sequence of the growing presence of Islam, a religion 
that, in the Netherlands, is largely taken to  maintain 
 restrictive views on sexuality (e.g. Van der Veer 2006; 
Verkaaik 2009; Mepschen et al 2010). Anthropologist 
Verkaaik, for instance, illustrates this by pointing us to 
the fact that Dutch homosexuals are mobilized in Dutch 
 secularist discourse, functioning as  representatitives 
of  sexular thought, while, at the same time,  Muslims 
 experience great difficulties in becoming accepted as 
 tolerated, integrated citizens (Verkaaik 2009: 144–147; 
see also Butler 2008; Bracke 2012).
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Again, such ‘liberal’ Dutch values concerning  sexuality 
are often assumed to derive from the 1960s, when the 
Netherlands supposedly featured the so-called sexual 
revolution.13 This revolution is often perceived to have 
broken the taboos on sexuality that were rampant during 
the previous pillarization, or the politico-denominational 
segregation of the Dutch society (Kennedy 1995). During 
the 1960s, the ideal of progressing towards modernity 
became a pivotal aspect of the Dutch zeitgeist. Modernity, 
the Dutch assumed, could only be achieved by saying 
farewell to the ‘dusty’ pillarization, and hence it became 
a widely shared conviction that the Dutch culture had 
to ‘depillarize’. Of major importance here was the taboo 
on sexuality, which was increasingly seen as the flag-
ship of the previous pillarization. Sexu ality, the Dutch 
 increasingly agreed, was in need of becoming an open 
and liberated topic. The taboos were in absolute need of 
breaking (Schnabel 1990: 15–17).
Consequently, in that period, the naked body was 
allowed to – or even encouraged to – be publicly shown. 
In the 1967, Phil Boom was the first woman to appear 
naked on the Dutch television, which resulted in a lot of 
controversy in Dutch society (Kennedy 1995). Additionally, 
videos concerning sex education appeared, developed to 
break the supposed traditional taboos concerning sexu-
ality (Schnabel 1990: 20). In 1968, naked theater shows 
entered the Amsterdam scene. These shows where called 
‘rhythmic pornographic show’ [‘Ritmiese Pornografie 
Sjoo’]. These improvised shows focused on naked women 
and men, who usually had used drugs, performing sexual 
practices (Hekma 1990: 108). Furthermore, sex maga-
zines such as ‘Gandalf’, ‘Chick’, and ‘The Candy’ emerged, 
(Schnabel 1990: 20) and in the 1970s, members of the 
‘Mad Mina’ [‘Dolle Mina’], a feminist protest group, in 
their effort to legitimize abortion, publicly showed their 
bellies, exposing the writing on their stomachs, which 
translated as ‘boss in my own belly’ (Kennedy 1995).
These examples, though quite varying, all indicate that 
the body was the tool par excellence to challenge suppos-
edly outdated restricting social codes, and, hence, the 
body became the flagship of liberal views on sex-related 
topics. It functioned as a tool for communicating, but, 
since the body is an indispensable part of sex itself, it was 
also capable of showing how these ideals – or rather the 
lack of such ideals – could be put to practice. The body 
needed to become ‘wild’ again, which, for many, implied 
that the restricting protocols from the past were to be 
deserted as soon as possible. The idea that people were 
restricted to have sex with one partner only, for instance, 
was considered outdated, as sexual pleasure was sug-
gested to be something ‘nice and enjoyable’ [‘leuk en 
 lekker’] (Schnabel 1990: 19).
However, Schnabel suggests that, in hindsight, it was 
not really sex as such that changed during the sexual rev-
olution. Rather, it was the publicness of sex that became 
subject to transformation. Changes concerning the eth-
ics of sex, for example, having premarital sex, already 
occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, but it was only during 
the sexual revolution that they became publicly visible 
(Schnabel 1990: 18–19). The attempts aimed at releasing 
sex from social codes in the 60s, which still is an important 
association Dutch people have with that period, did not 
really succeed (Schnabel 1990).
In 1967, the NVSH (‘Dutch Society for Sexual Reform’) 
president Mary Zeldenrust-Noordanus, held her ‘sextant 
speech’ [‘sextant-rede’]. The content of this speech was 
generally perceived to reflect the core ideas underlying the 
revolution (Schnabel 1990: 20). In that speech, Zeldenrust-
Noordanus addressed sex and urged for its ‘release’, but 
she did not really addressed what should be done once 
this was actually accomplished. In fact, Schnabel argues, a 
rather uncritical consensus prevailed, which assumed that 
all problems related to sex would immediately be solved 
once sex was finally set free.
However, from the 1970s on, an increasing number of 
sexual health and sexual therapy organizations appeared, 
which illustrates that the much-wanted release of sex 
had made the topic more difficult. It became increas-
ingly clear that the liberated wild sex could, in fact, only 
be wild to the extent that it would not violate the prin-
ciple of ‘absolute mutual agreement’ of both the partners 
involved (Schnabel 1990: 28).14 Both parties, therefore, had 
to engage in subtle negotiations. Sex was supposed to be 
something beautiful, respectable, and healthy, and in order 
to meet this demand, both parties needed to experience 
pleasure while, at the same time, they were also expected 
to respect each other (idem). The fact that sex had entered 
the public sphere contributed to this complexity as it was 
possible now to publicly address formerly exclusive private 
matters. The Dutch were able now to compare views and to 
reconsider their opinions (Schnabel 1990).
The NVSH started to provide people with advice on 
the difficult topic of sex. People could, for instance, write 
them questions about sex, which the NVSH answered in a 
public magazine. In his article ‘Samen of alleen’ [‘together 
or alone’], Dutch historical pedagogue Röling discusses 
such questions. One of these letters, written by a 50-year-
old man and which originates from 1980, is particularly 
interesting. In that letter, the author explicitly stresses the 
problems he and his wife are facing:
My wife has started to dress in her own way. […] 
Additionally, she wants me to provide her with the 
opportunity of letting her sexually approach me 
when she is ready for it, when she wants it. When 
she is in the mood. She also wants to lay in my 
arms, without having sex. Well, ok, I try to do so. 
However when we do that, I cannot help myself 
having an erection and I simply want more… […] 
Currently, we have not had sex for four weeks. […] 
Later that day, the tension was mounting. I said: 
you are the biggest bitch on the entire planet. She 
responded scornfully: “well it’s simple. My man 
wants to have sex and if he doesn’t, he gets angry”. 
We still read many books, too many, I guess. With 
every book on emancipation that we read, our 
marriage becomes more rotten (Röling 1990: 97, 
my translation).
Though we have seen before that sex supposedly had 
been ‘liberated’ from the restrictive social codes of the 
 pillarization, this letter clearly illustrates that shortly after 
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the supposed sexual revolution, sex had been ‘domesti-
cated’ by different social codes, which had put an empha-
sis on sex as something ‘difficult’, ‘respectable’ and ‘beauti-
ful’. So, regardless of the many pleas for the ‘unleashing’ 
of sex, sex only partly succeeded in becoming wild. Still, 
the idea of the 60s as a wild period during which sex was 
successfully liberated, is still a widely-shared notion in the 
Netherlands (Schnabel 1990). 
A Dutch sexular body 
The 1960s, during which the requirements of sex we have 
just seen became part of the Dutch culture, are also sup-
posed to have marked the start of another revolutionary 
process: secularization. According to scholar of religion 
Peter Van der Veer (2006: 118), this is still reflected in the 
“popular narrative among the Dutch […] that during this 
decade, they finally liberated themselves from the con-
straints of religion. Declines in church membership and 
church attendance were very steep during the 1960s, and 
in a relatively short period Holland was transformed from 
a highly religious to a highly secular society”.
The crucial point here is that, both the alleged aban-
doning of religion and the alleged abandoning of sup-
posedly outdated social protocols of sex, were put under 
the same umbrella of depillarization, and hence they 
were put together in the supposedly important process 
of progressing toward modernity (Kennedy 1995). So, we 
have returned to that what is captured in Scott’s notion 
of sexularism, as we see that notions of sex have been 
mixed-up with interpretations of secularism (Scott 2009; 
see also Mepschen et al. 2010; Verkaaik & Spronk 2011). In 
the Netherlands, the depillarization has led to a particu-
lar entanglement of cultural secularism with a particular 
ethic of sex.
Sociologist Marguerite van de Berg (2013) beautifully 
captures this ethic in her article ‘praten zonder blozen’ 
[‘talking without blushing’]. Through an empirical investi-
gation of a parenting course on sex education for children, 
she shows how openly discussing sexual topics is sug-
gested a solution for almost all problems related to sex. 
Van de Berg describes how, during an education about sex 
for parents where she participated in, a father – who hap-
pened to be one of the few autochthone people visiting 
the sessions – stated to have difficulties with his seven-
year-old daughter’s extraordinary interest in kissing.
Interestingly, the Educator misinterpreted his question 
– she interpreted his question as if his daughter had been 
harassed by boys at school – and she recommended the 
father to openly talk with his daughter, so that she could 
learn to postulate boundaries regarding what she appreci-
ated and what not. After repeating the question for the 
third time, the educator finally understood the problem, 
but she, interestingly, did not really adjust her advice: she 
though talking about it still should be an adequate solu-
tion. The father, however, did not seem satisfied and asked 
the other parents attending for advice. To the father’s sur-
prise, they recommended ‘simply’ forbidding his daugh-
ter’s behavior, implying that it was ridiculous he had not 
done so before.
Though van de Berg had very different aims with this 
fragment, it beautifully illustrates the complicated tensions 
a sexular body has to deal with. On the one hand, a Dutch 
sexular body should be free, not being restricted by any 
norm, and it should be able to openly discuss and do what-
ever ‘wild’ things it would like to do. To forbid behavior 
is taboo, as it is outdated: the Dutch have abandoned all 
constraints somewhere in the 1960s. To openly talk about 
sexual topics is the adequate solution, and, in fact, from 
the educator’s perspective, there is not really room for 
another one. A sexular body, it appears, does not blush.
On the other hand, a sexular body is subject to (addi-
tional) social protocols. The educator recommended the 
father to teach his daughter to set up boundaries; ensur-
ing that she became aware of the behavior she liked and 
that which she did not. By doing so, the daughter would 
seek for ‘standard boundaries’: boundaries in films, 
boundaries implicitly and explicitly recommended by 
parents or friends, and so on. In fact, this father consid-
ering his daughter’s behavior problematic indicates that 
some boundaries in fact already had been crossed: for the 
father, his daughter had been too wild already.
One can of course think of many more boundaries that 
are hegemonic in the Netherlands: one is expected to 
shave particular body parts, all bodies are expected – and 
recommended by sex specialists as we have seen above – 
to confirm to specific norms concerning seducing behav-
ior, and it is not accepted to show certain body parts on 
television. So, a sexular body respects others, controls its 
needs, and only engages in sex when it is ‘enjoyable for 
both partners’. A sexular body doesn’t “fuck”, a sexular 
body “makes love”.
The crucial question is, to return to our initial discus-
sion, whether all of this is secular. Or, in Hirschkind’s 
words: are the presented norms really part of a particular 
configuration of the human sensorium – of sensibilities, 
affects, embodied dispositions – specific to secular sub-
jects? (Hirschkind 2011: 633). Agreeing with Asad (2011), 
I would, again, argue that this is a matter of definitions. 
If we, for example, consider a secular body a body that is 
matching the ideals advocated by capitalist societies and 
modern empires (Asad 2011: 669), it seems reasonable to 
call it secular, especially when we take into account the 
educator’s organization (Rutgers WPF) is (partly) funded 
by the Dutch secular state. Or, if we embrace other defini-
tions, such as understanding “the secular to be a concept 
that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and 
sensibilities in modern life” (Asad 2003: 25), or practices 
discursively identified and valorized through the discourse 
of secularism (Hirschkind 2011: 663) it also makes sense 
to call this body secular. As we have seen, it is exactly the 
historical discourse of the secular that has ‘claimed’ these 
embodied configurations.
I am not so sure whether the sexular body I have sketched 
can be denoted secular if we demand that everything 
secular has to have a religious shadow (Hirschkind 2011: 
643–644). Of course, this once again depends on a defini-
tion (what exactly is a religious shadow?) and it could even 
be argued that, from a cultural secular perspective, this 
sexular body indeed features a religious shadow, as reli-
gion in the Dutch, lived society is considered differently 
than it is in academia: many in the Netherlands seem to 
consider religion as something outdated, dogmatic, and 
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oppressive (see Wiering 2016). I, however, understand 
religion as ‘something’ that connects people with ‘the rest 
of what is’ (see van de Port 2010), so for me it does not 
really makes sense to call this body secular as its religious 
shadow seems to have been removed: I do not think sexu-
ality necessarily relates to religion.
However, and this is the point I would like to highlight, 
if we look through the glasses of probably quite some peo-
ple living in the Dutch society, it seems perfectly suitable 
to denote the body I sketched secular. As we have seen, in 
the Dutch 1960s, both sex and religion were perceived to 
be in need of transformations: sexuality had to be ‘liber-
ated’ and the ‘dusty old forms of religion’ that had marked 
the pillarization, were considered to be anti-modern. As a 
result, notions of sexuality, and hence, the body, became 
entangled with secular notions as they were all brought 
under the same umbrella of ‘essential parts of modernity’. 
Therefore, looking from a bottom-up perspective, I argue 
that a secular body exists.
Like a particular cloak can be considered religious 
because it is often worn, and hence perceived to be claimed 
by Christian monks, like a particular embodied posture 
is considered religious because it is often employed by 
Buddhist Zen masters, I would argue that particular norms 
concerning the body that people strongly associated with 
the secular, for instance because they are claimed by 
some secular discourse, can indeed be considered  secular, 
because people in society conceive them as such. This 
also means that I do not think it is likely that there is only 
one sexular body: I expect that our future typologies will 
show us that there are many ideas circulating of what the 
 secular is, each of them entailing  normative statements, 
and some of them related to what a body should (not) do, 
and should (not) look like.
Hence, a sexular body, from a cultural secular perspec-
tive, is a body which affective-gestural repertoires, in the 
context of sex, people in society (historically) associate 
with the secular. The Dutch sexular body, for instance, 
should not blush, and, hence, is discouraged to do so. 
Throughout history, many Dutch have decided to instruct 
everyone to speak openly about their sexual life, and they 
have also decided that everyone should be engaged in 
complicated negations, because, as they also have agreed, 
sex is a difficult topic. Some, perhaps including myself, 
would not agree on the ‘secular-ness’ of this body as the 
religious shadow – at least as how I interpret this shadow 
– seems to have been removed. That does not matter, 
though, because my particular view is only one out of 
many. Other views should come, at least in my under-
standing, from our lived world. 
Conclusion
I have argued that we are in need of expanding our inquir-
ies of the secular through empirical research. I have 
encountered many works stressing a need for empirical 
inquiry into this phenomenon [...] (e.g. Verkaaik & Spronk 
2011; Cannell 2010; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt 2012; 
Cady & Hurd 2010), but relatively few have actually done 
so.15 With the material approach suggested in this essay, I 
firstly hope to have intrigued other scholars to reflect criti-
cally on the naturalness of their secular environment, and 
to invoke an empirically-based bottom-up perspective of 
the secular in our academic understanding, theoretically 
challenging as it might be.
Employing such a perspective enables us to find secu-
lar material forms, of which the analysis will contribute 
to our academic debates on the secular. The example of 
the sexular body has shown how the understanding of 
secularity in the Dutch society does not correspond with 
academic notions of that term, because, in Dutch society, 
supposedly neutral secularity is in fact dovetailed with 
particular sexular embodied configurations. I speculate 
that there are many other normative forms out there. 
How is secularity, but also the secular more generally, 
for instance related to – or perhaps even entangled with 
– topics such as race, gender, aesthetics, politics, the 
public sphere, Christianity, Judaism, food, dancing, love, 
sports, development, climate change, death, war, or the 
transcendental?
This brings me to my second point, which is that I plea 
for more awareness of the normativity that a secular 
climate currently entails besides its regularly discussed 
imposing of models that confine religion to particular 
spheres.16 The secular is also out there in other facets of 
society, mobilized, and understood in particular, not neu-
tral ways – potentially contradicting the ‘good’ intentions 
of the state – and as secularity has become the default 
option in our contemporary secular age, it urges people, 
on the pain of becoming marginalized by others, to not 
only be religious in particular ways, but also to embrace 
certain objects, sets of behavior, rituals, ideas, statements, 
and ideal images of bodies.
I do not know whether we can avoid such normativ-
ity, and, unfortunately, I tend to think that many in the 
Netherlands would in fact not like doing so. Not many 
will appreciate to participate in what they see as going 
backwards in time. I do, however, consider it necessary 
to clarify what exactly is implicitly imposed. The default 
option in society, its material forms, and its ‘unbelieving 
construals’, including all their normative features, are in 
absolute need of exploration.
Notes
 1 In this paper, for reasons of clarity, I use the notion 
of ‘the secular’ as an epistemic category that refers 
to “a realm or reality that is differentiated from the 
 religious” (Casanova 2009: 1049). In this ‘secular 
realm’, I understand ‘secularism’ (secular ideology) and 
secularity (a secular state of being) to be flourishing. 
This importantly implies that, when I, for instance, 
write about empirical scrutiny into ‘the secular’, the 
later includes secularity and secularism.
 2 This research is part of a broader project: ‘Sexuality, 
Religion and Secularism’, funded by the Dutch NWO.
 3 I agree with Casanova that it is secularity that has 
increasingly become the default option (2009: 1053).
 4 This section partly overlaps with a section I wrote else-
where (see Wiering 2016).
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 5 I do not have space here to elaborate on this particu-
lar bias towards Islam but it strikes me how often aca-
demia echoes, and hence contributes to, such narrow 
perspectives dominating in media and politics. The 
disproportionate amount of academic attention to the 
headscarf is a case in point (see also Wiering 2016).
 6 I realize that for some people, the state’s dealing with 
religion is in fact everyday life. Cultural and political 
secularism, therefore, can perfectly overlap.
 7 I do not think that it is necessary to, in a similar way, 
speak of ‘the cultural secular’ or ‘cultural secularity’, 
since these concepts do not know so much literature 
yet that is focused on their political dimension. In 
other words: the notions of the secular and secular-
ity, in contrast to secularism, are less likely linked to 
large amounts of philosophical or theological-politi-
cal debates that have successfully ‘claimed’ them as 
topics that are primarily stuff for politically-oriented 
studies.
 8 Although the article is fruitful on many levels, it is not 
constantly about the secular body. Rather, it seems 
Asad’s main aim is to (implicitly) problematize mod-
ern secular democracies. Although Asad states to 
acknowledge that a secular body’s existences and char-
acteristics depend on who is defining, most examples 
Asad presents explicitly mention and discuss negative 
features (e.g. sadism) that, as Asad implies, are charac-
teristic for modern secular societies, and subsequently 
how these features would be manifested in a secular 
body.
 9 An example of a comparable typology (though not 
based on views gathered from contemporary societies) 
can be found in the work of Barry Kosmin (2007: 3). 
In his typology of the cultural secular, we could sim-
ply replace Locke, for instance, by a particular group 
of people all supporting one interpretation of cultural 
secularism, which leads to an overview of the different 
understandings of secularism in society.
 10 Note that there are important differences between 
secularism as it is interpreted in Dutch politics, and 
secularism as it is grounded in Dutch law (see Tamimi 
Arab 2015).
 11 I realize that the idea of a sexual identity is an invent-
ing of the late 19th century (see Phillips & Reay 2011).
 12 Strictly speaking, these but also my upcoming findings 
are not sexular in Scott’s understanding of the notion. 
Scott tends to agree with one of Asad’s definition of 
the secular, namely being strongly related to the secu-
lar liberal state, and, hence, she considers secularism 
an ideology of the state that particularly aims to pri-
vatize religion. For Scott, sexularism thus seems to 
refer to the consignment of the passions (sexuality 
and religion) to the private sphere (See Scott 2009). 
This emphasis on the private/public domain is not so 
important in the work cited above.
 13 Often, such assumptions are incorrect or at least dubi-
ous. The supposed acceptance of homosexuality, for 
instance, is still strongly debated and it was not until 
the Dutch people experienced ‘a larger threat’ (Islam) 
in the 2000s, that homosexuality suddenly was consid-
ered ‘accepted’ (see Mepschen et al 2010).
 14 Interestingly, the conviction of sexuality involving 
two partners remained surprisingly unchallenged (see 
Röling 1990: 89).
 15 Besides the work of Lois Lee [(2014; 2015), the biblio 
mentions Lee 2014 – is that the reference you have in 
mind? I also discuss the body in two chapters in 2015, 
 Recognizing the Non-religious: Reimagining the Secular 
Oxford: Oxford  University Press? (Thanks for the refer-
ence by the way!)], I consider the work of the anthropol-
ogist  Matthew Engelke an important exception here as 
his work on secular humanists in England is an excellent 
example of the fruitfulness of examining the secular 
through empirical research (see Engelke 2014; 2015a; 
2015b).
 16 One could argue that ascribing such normativities to 
the secular should in fact not be encouraged because 
it might contribute to maintain and therefore prolong 
rather than overcome the stubborn problematic reli-
gion versus secular binary. I admit that this is a valid 
criticism. However, taking into account that so many 
are not familiar yet with the non-neutrality of the sec-
ular, I think ‘overcoming’ the binary, for now, simply is 
too ambitious. As a first step, we now need to expose 
the secular’s normativity in society.
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